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I. INTRODUCTION*
As a society, we want to protect children from abuse and neglect by their
parents. Few news stories ignite such outrage as when an out-of-control parent
beats a small child to death. We look to social workers and judges to intervene and
prevent these kinds of atrocities. At the same time, innocent parents need
protection from an uncontrolled bureaucracy. No one wants to needlessly
dismantle families. The detestable act of removing children from parents should
be reserved for situations of absolute necessity.
When courts place children in protective custody as a result of parental abuse
or neglect, the question arises as to whether and when it is safe to return them to
their parents. Sending children home before their parents have adequately
addressed their problems further endangers the children. On the other hand, failing
to allow rehabilitated parents to regain custody injures parents and children alike.
Further complicating this difficult issue is the matter of time. Children should not
languish in foster care, endlessly waiting for changes in-their parents that may
never materialize.
The federal and state Constitutions guarantee that no state shall deprive any person
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. A parent's interest in the
companionship, care, custody and management of his children is a compelling one,
ranked among the most basic of civil rights. Likewise, natural children have a
fundamental independent interest in belonging to a family unit, and they have
compelling rights to be protected from abuse and neglect and to have a placement
that is stable, permanent, and that which allows the caretaker to make a full
emotional commitment to the child. The interests of the parent and the child,
therefore, must be balanced.'
* I would like to express my deep gratitude to my husband and son for their unfailing support.
1. In re Marilyn H., 851 P.2d 826, 833 (Cal. 1993) (citations omitted).
This Comment will discuss the need for a revised standard of proof when a
court discontinues efforts to reunify a family and instead makes a permanent plan
for the child outside of the parents' home. Recent legislation reduces the time
given to parents for compliance with court-ordered reunification plans and
streamlines the adoption process of these children.2 As it becomes easier for
parents to forever lose their children to this system, the importance of fair and
accurate court decisions increases dramatically. Thus, the standard of proof
required in these proceedings is a critical safeguard to ensure careful deliberation
over such decisions.
First, this Comment presents a recent history and current structure of the
dependency court system.3 The next section discusses two major cases addressing
the standard of proof required when terminating parental rights.4 The final section
sets forth recommendations for change in the requisite standard of proof to be
applied when terminating family reunification services.5
IX. DEPENDENCY COURT HEARINGS
A. Statutory History
Nationwide, there are almost half a million children in foster care placement
due to abuse or neglect by their parents.6 The recent national trend is toward
expedited resolution of court intervention on behalf of these children.7 In 1979,
Congress responded to years of studies and hearings regarding the effects of foster
care placement on children by proposing an overhaul of child welfare systems
across the country Aiming to promote more permanent placements for children,
Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980.' The
2. For example, parents whose children were under the age of three at the time of initial removal
from the home are limited (with some exceptions) to six months of family reunification services before
facing possible termination of their parental rights and adoption of their children. See CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 361.5(a)(2) (West 1998); see also infra notes 37, 39.
3. See infra notes 6-47 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 48-138 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 139-164 and accompanying text.
6. See Raymond C. O'Brien, An Analysis of Realistic Due Process Rights of Children Versus
Parents, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1209,1242(1994) (citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CHILDREN, BEYOND
RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 283-84 (1991)); see also Jeanne
Ambrose, Beleaguered Children; After Deaths, Welfare Services Seek Safer Foster Care, CHI. TRtB.,
July 24, 1994, at 1, available in 1994 WL 6475240 (projecting an estimated 480,000 children in the
foster care system in 1994).
7. See, e.g., Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1997) (expanding
circumstances that meet requirements for proceedings to terminate parental rights).
8. See Cynthia D. v. Superioe'Ct., 851 P.2d 1307, 1308 (Cal. 1993) (citing Adoption Assistance
and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-272, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat. 500) 1450).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28, 670-79a (1994).
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Act provides the following three methods for achieving a permanent plan: (1)
family preservation efforts designed to safely keep the family together, (2)
reunification efforts toward rehabilitating the parents and sending the child home
from placement, and where reunification fails, (3) finding an appropriate long-term
home for the child.10
In 1982, California passed legislation to comply with the Federal Act." In
addition to providing a structure for dependency court procedures, it required clear
and convincing evidence of detriment to justify a child's removal from parental
custody, 2 reunification services for parents, 3 six month judicial reviews,14 and
permanency planning hearings when parents fail to reunify with a child within
twelve to eighteen months of detention. 5 The permanent plans available to a court
include adoption, legal guardianship and long-term foster care.'6 California Civil
Code section 232 required a separate action to terminate parental rights if the plan
was for adoption. 7 Unfortunately, the "232 action" frequently took several years
to complete." I
Because of this delay, among other things, the Legislature passed Senate Bill
No. 243 in 1987.'9 This legislation changed the procedure for terminating parental
rights for children who were dependents of the court.2" The 232 action was no
longer required.2' Instead, a brief "selection and implementation hearing" would
occur within 120 days of the twelve or eighteen month review hearing.22 It was
possible to terminate parental rights at this hearing if the court found that the child
was adoptable and adoption was in the child's best interests.2 3
10. See id. §§ 671(a)(15), 675(1)(B).
11. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1308 (citing Act effective Sept. 12,1982, Ch. 978,1982 Cal. Stat.
3525).
12. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361 (West 1998).
13. See id. § 361.5.
14. See id. §§ 364, 366.
15. See id. § 366.25.
16. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1308.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 1308-09. "'The passage of five or more years from initial removal of the child from
its home to ultimate resolution and repose [was] by no means unusual."' Id. (quoting In re Micah S.,
243 Cal. Rptr. 756, 761 (Ct. App. 1988) (Brauer, J., concurring)).
19. See id. at 1309.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21(g), 366.22(a), 366.26 (West 1998).
23. See id. § 366.26.
B. Current Procedures
California's child protection statutes have three objectives. 24 First, they protect
children who are at risk or are currently suffering abuse, neglect, or exploitation.
Second, they strive to preserve the family to the extent possible.26 Finally, they are
designed to resolve cases without delay.7
A juvenile dependency court intervenes in the life of a family when a police
officer, probation officer or social worker takes a child into protective custody
based on a belief that the child has been or is in immediate danger of abuse or
neglect as defined by section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. 8 Once a
child is detained, a petition must be filed within forty-eight hours, excluding non-
judicial days, alleging abuse or neglect that would bring the child within the
juvenile court's jurisdiction pursuant to section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code. 29 A "detention hearing" must then be held no later than the end of the next
judicial day. 30 At this hearing, a court will determine if the child shall remain
detained or be released to the parents.3'
The ensuing process has been described in four phases: (1) jurisdiction, (2)
disposition, (3) reunification, and (4) selection and implementation of a permanent
plan. 2 If the permanent plan is adoption, the court will terminate the parents'
rights.
33
24. See In re Daniel G., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 75, 79 (Ct. App. 1994).
25. See id. (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3000)).
26. See id. (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300, 3000)).
27. See id. (citing Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307, 1309 (Cal. 1993)).
28. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 300, 305, 306 (West 1997). Section 300 enumerates the
conditions that would bring the child under the jurisdiction of the juvenile dependency court. See id.
§ 300. For examples of statutes defining dependency court jurisdiction in other states, see COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 19-1-103 (West 1997), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.01 (11) (West 1997), MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.191 (West 1997), OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.353 (Anderson 1997). It is possible to alert
officials to an abusive situation in a variety of ways. Certain professionals who work with children are
mandated by law to report suspected or known instances of child abuse or neglect. See, e.g., CAL. PEN.
CODE § 11166 (West 1998). Additionally, private citizens such as friends, neighbors or family may call
police or protective services if they know of or suspect child abuse or neglect. See id. § 11166(d).
29. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 313(a) (West 1997).
30. See id. § 315.
31. See id.
32. See In re Matthew C., 862 P.2d 765, 768 (Cal. 1993).
33. See id. For a discussion of termination statutes throughout the country, see Maryann Zavez,
Rethinking Vermont's Termination of Parental Rights Laws: Guidelines for a Comprehensive
Termination of Parental Rights Statute, 19 VT. L. REV. 49, 64-78 (1994).
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The jurisdiction phase involves the adjudication of the petition.34 The court
will determine whether the allegations in the petition are true, thus bringing the
child within the court's jurisdiction.35 If the petition is sustained, the court must
then hold a disposition hearing to decide whether the parents will lose custody of
the child.
3 6
If the court removes the child from the parents, it will order the parents to
participate in a plan designed to resolve the issues that necessitated court
intervention. 37 The case plan is based upon an evaluation of the problems that
brought the family before the court and sets forth specific goals and services
offered to accomplish family reunification. 3' The reunification phase may last
from six to eighteen months.39
Following the disposition hearing, the court must review the progress of the
family at least every six months.40 If the parents have failed to complete the plan
that would enable the child to safely return home, the court will continue to
supervise the family until the statutorily allotted period for reunification ends.4 If,
34. See In re Matthew C., 862 P.2d at 768 (citing Cynthia D. v. Superior Court, 851 P.2d 1307,
1309-10 (Cal. 1993)).
35. See id. (citing Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1309-10).
36. See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 358, 361); Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1310). This
comment will focus on the process involved when the court removes the child. See infra notes 39-167
and accompanying text. However, if the court finds the child to be a person described by § 300, but
does not find that it would be detrimental for the child to live with the parents, the court may order the
child to remain at home under court supervision and order family maintenance services. See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 360(b) (West 1998).
37. See In re Matthew C., 862 P.2d at 768 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5); Cynthia D.,
851 P.2d at 1310). There are, however, thirteen listed circumstances under which the court will remove
the child and make an order for no reunification services, thus moving directly from the disposition
phase to the permanent plan phase. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361.5(b). For example, if a parent
severely sexually or physically abused the child or a sibling, or caused the death of another child
through abuse or neglect, or has been convicted of a violent felony, no reunification services will be
ordered unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that doing so would be in the child's
best interests. See id. § 361.5(b)(4), (6), (11), (c).
38. See id. § 16501.1(f)(1), (2), (9).
39. See id. § 361.5(a). If on the date of the child's initial removal from the parents, the child was
under age three, reunification services will be provided for a maximum of six months. See id. §
361.5(a)(2). If the child was age three or older upon removal, reunification will last for a period not
exceeding twelve months. See id. § 361.5(a)(1). The court may, however, extend reunification services
to a maximum of eighteen months, but only if there is a substantial probability that the child can be
safely returned to a parent within that period or if the social services department has failed to provide
the parents with reasonable services. See id. § 361.5(a).
40. See id. § 366. Additionally, federal funding requirements under the Adoption Assistance and
Child Welfare Act mandate a review of each child, administratively or by the court, at least every six
months. See 42 U.S.C. § 675(1), (5) (1994)
41. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.
at that time, the parents continue to pose a detriment to the child and the social
services department has provided the family with reasonable services, the court will
terminate reunification services and make a permanent plan for the child.42
The permanent plan could be adoption, guardianship, or long-term placement
in foster care.43 The court, in determining which permanent plan to select, will
choose the option that would be in the best interests of the child." If adoption is
the chosen alternative, the county begins proceedings to terminate the parental
rights, thus freeing the child for adoption.45 Once a court terminates a parent's
rights, the parent permanently loses custody, visitation, and virtually any
relationship with the child.' Therefore, courts must find by clear and convincing
evidence that the child is adoptable before terminating the parents' rights.4 7
42. See id. § 366.21 (g), (h); see also 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(C) (1997).
43. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(b).
44. See id. § 366.26(c)(4), (h). For example, if a child has a strong bond with a parent despite
lengthy placement outside of the parent's home, adoption would not likely be an appropriate permanent
plan. See id. § 366.26(c)(1)(A). Moreover, for a teenager who is not adoptable and for whom there is
no potential guardian, long-term foster care may be the most permanent plan available. See id. §
366.26(c)(1)(C).
This determination can be difficult and complicated when a child six years or older has a strong bond
to a caretaker who is unwilling to pursue adoption or guardianship out of loyalty to the parent or for
other reasons, but is willing to commit to long term care of the child. See id. § 366.26(c)(1)(D). The
court must decide whether it is in the child's best interests to be uprooted again in search of an adoptive
family or whether this would make the child hesitant to bond in future relationships, fearing further
separation. See id. § 366.26(h). Experts have not resolved this dilemma, and policies that mandate
selection of the most permanent available option can obfuscate a determination by the court of what is
truly in the child's best interests. See generally Zavez, supra note 33 (discussing termination statutes
throughout the country).
45. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE. § 366.25(d)(1), 366.26(b)(1).
46. See id. § 366.26(b)(1); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 (1982). But cf CAL.
FAM. CODE §§ 8714.7, 8715 (West 1998) (creating "kinship adoption agreements"). A newly enacted
statute, applicable to adoptions by relatives, allows the natural parents a limited role in the child's life.
See id. Terms of the agreement regarding visitation and future contact with birth parents and other birth
relatives are open to renegotiation in the future to accommodate changes in circumstances. See id. §
8714.7(h). In sum, this option may encourage many relatives to pursue adoption who might have
otherwise rejected making such a commitment due to feelings of loyalty towards the parents.
47. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1). See generally Martin Guggenheim, The Effects
of Recent Trends to Accelerate the Termination of Parental Rights of Children in Foster Care-An
EmpiricalAnalysis in Two States, 29 FAm. L.Q. 121 (1995). Martin Guggenheim documents the results
of policies aimed at expediting parental rights terminations in hopes of facilitating adoptions in
Michigan and New York. See id. at 134-35. He concludes that many children have become legal
orphans when adoptions fail to materialize and children are left in limbo because the terminations are
irrevocable. See id. at 134. There is additional concern that these adverse effects fall disproportionately
on the poor and those of color. See id; see also Zavez, supra note 33, at 66-67. In response to the
problem of legally orphaning children through unnecessary termination of parental rights, California
now provides courts with the option of ordering efforts to locate an adoptive family for the child within
180 days when no adoptive family has been selected prior to the 366.26 hearing. See CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 366.26(b)(2).
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1I. THE STANDARD OF PROOF
Because of the serious nature of termination proceedings, courts have
frequently given special consideration to due process safeguards.4" When a
dependency action reaches the stage of termination of parental rights, "the State's
aim is not simply to influence the parent-child relationship but to extinguish it."'49
Furthermore, the termination of a parent's rights is comprehensive and permanent.5"
The Santosky Court noted that "[f]ew forms of state action are both so severe and
so irreversible.'
The United States Supreme Court has held that parents have a liberty interest
in their relationship with their children that is fundamental and therefore protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.52 As such, due process requires that termination
of this relationship must include notice and an opportunity for an appropriate
hearing. 3 "The 'right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss
of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal
conviction, is a principle basic to our society." 54
In Matthews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court set forth three factors for
consideration when evaluating the specific requirements for procedural due process
in any given type of case: first, the private interest affected by the action; second,
the risk of error caused by the procedures used and the value of using additional
procedural safeguards; third, the government's interest, taking into account the
burdens that additional safeguards would impose.55 In Santosky v. Kramer, the
United States Supreme Court used these three factors from Eldridge to consider the
appropriate standard of proof for terminating parental rights.56
"[T]he standard of proof is a crucial component of legal process, the primary
function of which is 'to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions."' Notice,
summons, right to counsel, rules of evidence, and evidentiary hearings are all
48. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758; Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 40
(1981).
49. See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 39.
50. See id.
51. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 759.
52. See id. at 753.
53. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950) ("[A]t a
minimum [the Due Process Clause] require[s] that deprivation of life, liberty or property by
adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.").
54. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
55. See id. at 334-35.
56. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 758.
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procedures to place information before the fact finder. But only the standard of
proof "instruct[s] the fact finder concerning the degree of confidence our society
thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions" he draws from that
information. 7
The minimum allowable standard of proof is an indication of the importance
of the interests involved. 8 Furthermore, the standard is "a societal judgment about
how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants."59
The application of a preponderance standard in civil actions between private
litigants reflects society's casual willingness to allocate the risks of an erroneous
decision evenly among the parties.6" In contrast, the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard employed in criminal proceedings expresses society's deep concern over
the possibility of erroneous convictions.6 Thus, under the strict standard of
reasonable doubt, society itself assumes the vast majority of risk for error.62
In Santosky, the Supreme Court decided that the minimum burden of proof
required in parental rights termination cases was clear and convincing evidence.63
The Court used this intermediate standard of proof when "the individual interests
at stake in a state proceeding are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial
than mere loss of money."'" For example, the Court imposed a clear and
convincing standard for involuntary commitments to psychiatric facilities,65
deportation hearings 66 and denaturalization proceedings. 67 Like termination of
parental rights, the Court noted that all of these actions involve State-sponsored
proceedings against individuals, carrying the daunting possibility of considerable
loss of liberty.68
The Court then applied the three Eldridge factors to parental rights termination
proceedings and found that "the private interest is commanding; the risk of error
from using a preponderance standard is substantial; and the countervailing
governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight."'69 Therefore,
57. Id. at 757 n.9 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442
U.S. 1, 13 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970)).
58. See id.
59. See id. at 755.
60. See id. (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (holding that the standard of
proof required by due process reflects not only the weight of the parties involved, but also a societal
judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed)).
61. See id. (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424, 427).
62. See id. (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424).
63. See id. at 769-70. The Court rejected New York's standard of "fair preponderance of the
evidence" as constitutionally insufficient. See id. at 747-48.
64. See id. at 756 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424).
65. See id. at 756 n.8 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 427, 433).
66. See id. (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966)).
67. See id. (citing Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960)).
68. See id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26).
69. See id. at 758.
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the Court rejected the preponderance standard in favor of the clear and convincing
standard for termination proceedings.7"
Remarking that the preponderance standard by definition focuses on the
quantity instead of the quality of evidence, the Court expressed concern that use of
this standard may misdirect a court's decision on a borderline case.7 Because of
the considerable importance of the private interests involved, the Court found the
social consequences of even infrequent error to be substantial.72
Furthermore, the Court stated that a heightened standard of proof would have
"both practical and symbolic consequences."73 As an example, the Court pointed
out that the elevated standard of proof required in criminal prosecutions is an
effective tool in reducing the number of erroneous convictions based on factual
mistakes.74 Accordingly, the Court concluded that an increased standard of proof
would remind fact finders of the significance of pending decisions and thereby
decrease the likelihood of unjust terminations.75
At the time of the Santosky decision, thirty-five states and the District of
Columbia already required a standard above preponderance for termination of
parental rights hearings.76 In fact, New Hampshire specified a standard of "beyond
reasonable doubt" prior to Santosky.7 7 Although the New Hampshire statute for
parental-rights termination specified only a standard of clear and convincing
evidence,78 the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that the higher standard is
70. See id. at 758-59.
71. See id. at 764 (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 n.3 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
72. See id.
73. See id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 426).
74. See id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 363).
75. See id. at 764-65 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 427).
76. See id. at 749 & n.3. By statute, the following fifteen states mandated a standard of, or
comparable to, clear and convincing evidence: Alaska, California, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See id. at n.3.
Courts in the following fifteen states and the District of Columbia specified the standard of proof
as clear and convincing evidence or the equivalent: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Minnesota,
Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington,
and Wyoming. See id.
Two other states, Illinois and New York, required clear and convincing evidence under certain
circumstances, such as minor parents or mental illness. See id. New Hampshire and Louisiana had a
heightened standard, requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Seeid. Only one state, South Dakota,
required a "clear preponderance" standard. See id.
77. See State v. Robert H., 393 A.2d 1387, 1389 (N.H. 1978) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to terminate parental rights).
78. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C:10 (1994).
necessary because of the possible termination of "liberty and natural rights of
parents guaranteed under [the] New Hampshire Constitution."79
Termination proceedings filed pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act also
mandate the use of the reasonable doubt standard."0 In order to terminate parental
rights under this statute, evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
"continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to the child."'"
One commentator urged lowering the standard in termination cases to a
preponderance in order to facilitate freeing children for adoption.82 Arguing that
the increased time and difficulty of presenting clear and convincing evidence create
a delay that is harmful to children, the author stated that the best interests of the
children are less valuable than the parents' rights when courts employ the higher
standard."3
Interestingly, ten years after Santosky, the California Supreme Court upheld
a preponderance standard of proof in termination of parental rights hearings arising
from dependency court cases." In Cynthia D., the court distinguished the current
juvenile dependency system in California from the procedures that existed in New
York at the time of Santosky.85 New York's procedure required the state to prove
parental unfitness at the termination hearing. 6 In contrast, the California statutory
scheme requires no showing of parental fault at the time parental rights are
terminated. 7 The Cynthia D. court noted that the question of parental inadequacy
is repeatedly litigated prior to the termination hearing.88
First, the petition filed against the parents alleging abuse or neglect is
adjudicated under a preponderance standard.89 If the petition is sustained and the
court finds that the child comes within its jurisdiction, a disposition hearing must
be held.9 At the disposition hearing, in order to remove the child from the care and
custody of the parents, the court must find by clear and convincing evidence that
it would be detrimental to the child to return home. 91 The court must then review
the case at least every six months.92 Upon review, the court must return the child
79. See Robert H., 393 A.2d at 1389.
80. See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1994).
81. See id.
82. See O'Brien, supra note 6, at 1243.
83. See id.
84. See Cynthia D. v. Superior Ct., 851 P.2d 1307, 1315 (Cal. 1993).
85. See id. at 1313-15.
86. See id. at 1314.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1315.
89. See id. at 1310 (citing Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § 355); CAL. R. OF CT., rule 1450(0).
90. See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 358; CAL. R. OF CT., rules 1451, 1455).
91. See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 361(b); CAL. R. OF CT., rule 1456(c)); see also In
re Katrina C., 247 Cal. Rptr. 784 (Ct. App. 1988) (holding that clear and convincing evidence is
necessary to remove a child from a custodial parent and place with a non-custodial parent).
92. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1310 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366).
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to the parents unless the county proves by a preponderance of the evidence that so
doing would "'create a substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional
well-being of the minor.' 93 Furthermore, the court must find by a preponderance
of the evidence at each of these review hearings that the social services department
has made reasonable efforts towards providing reunification services to the
family.
94
If the court is unable to safely return the child to the parents within the
maximum allowable period for reunification, the court will terminate reunification
services.95 Before ending efforts to reunify the family, the court must make two
findings: first, the court must find by a preponderance of the evidence that
returning the child to a parent would create a substantial risk of detriment to the
child's physical or emotional well-being; second, the court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that the social services -department has made reasonable
efforts towards family reunification. 6
If the court terminates reunification services, it will then make a permanent
plan for the child.97 If the permanent plan selected is adoption, the court must find
by clear and convincing evidence that the child is adoptable.9 Finally, the court
must consider whether it would be detrimental to the child to terminate parental
rights.99 A court may terminate parental rights only after making all of the above
findings.
The court in Cynthia D. concluded that the three Eldridge factors, examined
in Santosky and held to compel a heightened standard of proof in that case, do not
justify the same standard under California's statutory scheme."° In Santosky, the
Court found the first factor, the private interest that is impacted, to tip strongly
toward the side of the parents when the State is attempting to prove that they have
permanently neglected the child.' In fact, the Court in Santosky likened the fact-
finding stage of the New York permanent neglect hearing to a criminal trial. 2
Furthermore, the Santosky Court stated that "until the State proves parental
93. See id. (quoting CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21(e), 366.22(a)); CAL. R. OF CT., rule
1461). Failure by the parents to participate in a court-ordered treatment plan is prima facie evidence
that continued court supervision is warranted. See CAL. R. OF CT., rule 1462(a)(2)(A).
94. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1310 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21(g)(1),
366.22(a)).
95. See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.21(g)).
96. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.22(a).
97. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1310 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21(g), 366.26).
98. See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)(1)).
99. See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 366.26(c)).
100. See id. at 1313.
101. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 759 (1982).
102. See id. at 762.
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unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous
termination of their natural relationship."'
10 3
In contrast, the court in Cynthia D. noted that by the time of the termination
hearing under the California procedure, the parents have been repeatedly held to
be a danger to their child. The parents' and child's interests have diverged."° At
this point, the court stated that the child's interests predominate. 0 5 Because a court
must find by clear and convincing evidence that the child is adoptable before
terminating parental rights, the child has an interest in being freed for adoption."
Thus, the Cynthia D. court concluded that employing a higher standard of proof
ultimately allocates greater risk to the child than to the parents.0 7
Next, the court in Cynthia D. considered the second Eldridge factor examined
in Santosky, the probability of erroneous judgment under the challenged
procedure. '08 "The New York scheme employed 'imprecise substantive standards
that [left] determinations unusually open to the subjective values of the judge,' thus
allowing 'unusual discretion to underweigh probative facts that might favor the
parent."" ' In contrast, the court noted that California's policy encourages family
preservation when feasible."0 Furthermore, California courts are statutorily
required to make repeated and specific findings regarding parental danger and risk
to the child before ever reaching the termination proceeding."'
In Santosky, the Court endeavored to equalize the disproportionate power
between the State and the parents by requiring a heightened standard of proof." 2
"The State's ability to assemble its case almost inevitably dwarfs the parents'
ability to mount a defense.""..3 Unlike New York's scheme, the court in Cynthia
D. pointed out that parents in California have a significantly greater chance of a fair
hearing because of mandatory appointment of counsel for parents unable to afford
it, whenever out-of-home placement is involved." 4
Moreover, California statute entitles the parents' attorneys to see all pertinent
records, including those of public and private agencies, medical personnel, and
child care custodians. 's Additionally, the parents have a statutory presumption at
review hearings that the child will be returned to their custody unless the State
proves that placing the child with the parents would be detrimental to the child." 6
103. See id. at 760; see also Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1313.
104. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2dat 1314.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 82-83.
108. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1314.
109. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982)).
110. See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3000)).
111. See id. (citing CAL. WELF.& INST. CODE §§ 300(a), 361(b)(1), 366.21(e), (f), 366.22(a)).
112. See id.
113. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763.
114. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1314 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(b)).
115. See id. (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(0).
116. See id. at 1314-15 (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 366.21(e), (f), 366.22(a)).
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Therefore, the court viewed the likelihood of an erroneous judgment against a
parent involved in a California termination proceeding as remote under these
circumstances." 7
The third factor analyzed by the Court in Santosky was the governmental
interest in using the procedure at issue to promote the best interests of the child and
to contain administrative costs."' The Santosky Court held that a higher standard
would advance both of these goals." 9 Regarding administrative costs, the Court
observed the significant number of states that already required the higher standard
of proof. 2' Furthermore, the Court noted that in New York the standard for
proving traffic infractions was clear and convincing evidence.' 2' "We cannot
believe that it would burden the State unduly to require that its fact finders have the
same factual certainty when terminating the parent-child relationship as they must
have to suspend a driver's license."' 22
Nevertheless, the court in Cynthia D. countered that the California statutory
scheme attempts to protect the parent-child relationship and to avoid the danger of
erroneous judgments in such a variety of ways that "it would be fanciful to think
that these state interests require what in most cases would be a sixth inquiry into
whether the severance of parental ties would be detrimental to the child.'
' 23
The court stated that the numerous findings that are necessary preconditions
to terminating parental rights so clearly establish the detriment to the child from the
parents that "there is no longer 'reason to believe that positive, nurturing parent-
child relationships exist.' "' Therefore, the state interest in family preservation has
ended by this stage of the proceedings.' 25 To the contrary, the state now has an
interest in locating a permanent and stable home for the child.
26
The court held that because previous court findings have unambiguously
documented the parents' inability to reunify with the child, requiring a higher
standard of proof would place an unnecessary burden upon efforts to permanently
place the child.'27 Not only is a heightened standard inappropriate at the
117. See id.
118. See id. at 1315.
119. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
120. See id. at 767; see also supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
121. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767-68 (citingN.Y. VEH. &TRAF. LAW § 227.1 (McKinney 1996);
In re Rosenthal v. Hartnett, 326 N.E.2d 811 (1975)).
122. Id. at 768.
123. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1315.





termination hearing, but any evidence of parental unfitness is superfluous at this
point, the court commented.
1 28
Therefore, the court concluded that the statutory scheme in California for
termination of parental rights satisfies the due process requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 29 The court found that the scheme sets forth "precise and
demanding substantive and procedural requirements" with which the petitioning
agency must comply prior to recommending termination. 30 The court described
these requirements as "carefully calculated to constrainjudicial discretion, diminish
the risk of erroneous findings of parental inadequacy and detriment to the child,
and otherwise protect the legitimate interests of the parents."'' As such, the court
held that the preponderance standard for terminating parental rights adequately
satisfies the demands of due process set forth by the three Eldridge factors.'32
Unfortunately, the court took an optimistic view of judicial fact finding that
fails to comport with reality. A court handling from forty to fifty cases in a single
day, as some courts in large cities must, is unable to give every case a fresh look
each time it is reviewed.'33 It is inevitable that the past findings made in the case
influence its appearance to the court.
The requirement for repeated findings prior to termination does not necessarily
diminish the risk of error. In fact, the United States Supreme Court, in Santosky,
rejected the very reasoning that was subsequently adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Cynthia D." The Santosky Court specifically rejected the
argument that the state's procedural scheme must be considered as a "package."'
' 35
The Court explained:
Indeed, we would rewrite our precedents were we to excuse a constitutionally
defective standard of proof based on an amorphous assessment of the "cumulative
effect" of state procedures. In the criminal context, for example, the Court has never
assumed that "strict substantive standards or special procedures compensate for a
lower burden of proof.".. . The statutory provision of right to counsel and multiple
hearings before termination cannot suffice to protect a natural parent's fundamental
liberty interests if the State is willing to tolerate undue uncertainty in the






133. See Jeff M. v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 346 (Ct. App. 1997). The Jeff M. court
commented regarding Los Angeles County juvenile dependency court judges, "We are mindful that
juvenile court judges, while diligent and caring, are overworked and doing their best to juggle ever-
increasing caseloads while suffering grossly inadequate resources. The current judge in this case, alone,
handles a daily calendar of 40 to 50 cases, including four or five trials .... " Id.
134. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757 n.9 (1982).
135. See id.
136. Id. (quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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Despite the Cynthia D. court's attempt to distinguish the California statutory
scheme from that of New York, the Santosky opinion already responded to claims
that existing procedures obviated the need for a heightened standard of proof.'
The Court found this justification for a preponderance standard unacceptable.' 38
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE
Although the rationale of the majority decision in Cynthia D. is questionable,
its conclusion is sound insofar as neither a higher standard of proof nor further
review of the parents' fitness at the parental rights termination hearing is the
answer.'39 Instead, the standard of proof for the prior order terminating
reunification services should be elevated to clear and convincing evidence of
detriment to the child if returned to the parents.
Currently, the standard for this finding is a preponderance of the evidence. 4 °
The order to terminate reunification services, rather than the actual termination of
parental rights, is the true death knell for the parents. It is the turning point in a
dependency case.' 4'
Furthermore, a parent can contest the recommendation by a social worker to
terminate reunification services and request the return of the child prior to such an
order being made.'42 However, the court will not consider returning the child to the
custody of the parent after terminating reunification services and ordering the child
permanently placed.'43
"After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care,
custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount. Rather, at this
point 'the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability', and
in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best
interests of the child." "Hence, the proceeding terminating reunification services
and setting a section 366.26 hearing is generally the party's last opportunity to
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See generally Cynthia D. v. Superior Ct., 851 P.2d 1307,1307-15 (Cal. 1993) (discussing why
neither a heightened standard of review nor additional review of parents' fitness is appropriate at the
parental rights termination hearing).
140. See CAL. WELF. &INST. CODE §§ 366.21(e), (f), 366.22(a) (West 1998).
141. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1317 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
142. See In re Johnny M., 279 Cal. Rptr. 693, 699 (Ct. App. 1991).
143. See In re Marilyn H., 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 79, 83 (Ct. App. 1992) aff'd, 851 P.2d 826 (Cal. 1993)
(holding that a court will not consider placement with a parent after termination of reunification
services). An exception to this general rule applies when a parent proves prior to a 366.26 hearing that,
pursuant to section 388, a change of circumstances exists and the court finds that modifying the plan
is in the child's best interest. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 388.
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litigate the issue of parental fitness as it relates to any subsequent termination of
parental rights, or to seek the child's return to parental custody."'
144
Thus, after the termination of reunification services, the termination of parental
rights is almost certain to follow if the child is adoptable.145 Therefore, this is the
critical time when the second Eldridge factor, risk of erroneous decision, is of
paramount importance to both the parent and the child. Justice Kennard, in her
dissenting opinion in Cynthia D., stated that the majority misapplied the three
Eldridge factors by focusing on the order to terminate parental rights, rather than
on the earlier order to terminate reunification services.'46 Moreover, Justice
Kennard noted that the mother's argument, which the majority entirely failed to
address, was that the lower standard of proof for terminating reunification services
in California does not comport with the due process requirements set forth in
Santosky 47
Justice Kennard then applied the Eldridge factors to the more critical and
relevant decision to terminate reunification services. 4 The dissent found the first
factor, the private liberty interest, "just as 'fundamental' and 'commanding"' as it
was in Santosky. "4' Furthermore, the deprivation of parental rights threatened by
California's dependency laws is just as permanent as was New York's under
Santosky.' Therefore, Justice Kennard concluded that the private interest
impacted by this procedure justifies the same standard of proof required by
Santosky: clear and convincing evidence."'
The second Eldridge factor is the risk that a preponderance standard will result
in an "erroneous deprivation of parental rights."' 52  The Court in Santosky
considered this risk to be significant because the state was better equipped to
prosecute its case and due to the possibility of discrimination against parents who
were generally "'poor, uneducated, or members of minority groups. '""" While
acknowledging differences between the current California dependency scheme and
that of New York at the time of Santosky, the dissent found that California's system
does not substantially reduce the risk of an erroneous decision regarding the return
of a child to the custody of the parents.5 4 Furthermore, a child will always be
144. In re Elizabeth R., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 200, 208 (Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted)
(quoting In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1994); In re Matthew C., 862 P.2d 765 (Cal. 1993)).
145. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1311.
146. See id. at 1319-20 (1993) (Kennard, J., dissenting).
147. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
148. See id. at 1320-21 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 1320 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
150. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 1321 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
152. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
153. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting) (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,763-64 (1982)).
154. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
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placed outside the parents' home when this question is considered.'55 Therefore,
the state has an advantage in assembling its case.'56
Additionally, Justice Kennard observed that the probability of an adopting
family having more adequate resources and being less subject to bias than the
natural parents is just as likely to occur in California as in New York.'57 Moreover,
raising the standard of proof alerts the fact finder to the importance of the decision
and diminishes the risk of error.'58 Because of the significance of parental rights,
Justice Kennard remarked that these rights should not be subjected to any needless
risk. 59
Finally, the third Eldridge factor is the government's interest in maintaining
the preponderance standard.16 ° The two considerations discussed by Santosky are
administrative costs and the state's interest in the child's welfare. 6' First, "a
stricter standard of proof would reduce factual error without imposing substantial
fiscal burdens on the State."' 62 Second, the dissent in Cynthia D. noted that
increasing the accuracy of critical decisions regarding children by raising the
standard of proof can only serve to advance children's welfare.'63
Justice Kennard concluded that an analysis under the Eldridge factors
establishes that a heightened standard of proof "would best promote factual
certainty in making the finding that is critical to terminating parental rights, while
striking a fair balance between the competing interests of the parents and the
state."'164
Because of the increased risk of erroneous decisions and the resulting gravity
of harm created by the use of a preponderance standard, a finding of clear and
convincing evidence of detriment to the child should be required prior to
terminating reunification services.
V. CONCLUSION
This Comment offers no criticism regarding ongoing reforms designed to
minimize the damaging effects of out-of-home placement on children. Limiting the
155. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
156. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
157. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 1320-21 (Kennard, J., dissenting) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,764-65
(1982)).
159. See id. at 1321 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
160. See id. (Kennard, J., dissenting).
161. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766.
162. Id.
163. See Cynthia D., 851 P.2d at 1321 (Kennard, J., dissenting).
164. See id.
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parent of a child less than three years old to only six months of reunification is
severe, but justified due to the fragile developmental needs of a small child. A
young child who has not seen a parent in six months will scarcely remember her,
much less retain an emotional connection to her as a parent. Instead, the child will
have bonded with the caretaker and deserves permanence and stability if the parent
fails to demonstrate a commitment to reunify with this child. The child's emotional
needs are unquestionable.
In addition to allowing parents of children younger than three a maximum of
six months of reunification,' no less than thirteen grounds now exist upon which
courts at disposition may deny parents any opportunity to reunify with their
children.' 66 Under this statute, courts can move quickly towards irrevocably
extinguishing parents' fundamental liberty interest in their relationship with their
children.
Because of these changes in the law, the deck is now so clearly stacked against
parents that the meager preponderance standard required for the termination of
reunification services is shocking. In addition to this procedural imbalance that
parents must overcome to prevent the dismemberment of their families, they may
face the unfortunate reality of being but one of fifty cases on ajudge's calendar for
that day.' 6
7
As a society, we want justice for both children and parents. If the proper
course of action in a case is to terminate reunification services and pursue adoption
for a child, it should be done swiftly. Our current statutory scheme accomplishes
that objective.
But along the way, prior to the final act that will allow the irrevocable severing
of a parental relationship, a sign for the judge to slow down and proceed with
caution is needed. A heightened standard of clear and convincing evidence will
instill in the fact finder society's expectation and mandate that this particular
decision be given the careful deliberation it deserves.
Increasing the standard of proof at this precarious juncture would not derail
efforts to protect children. To the contrary, it would simply ensure more accurate
and diligent handling of the most critical decision in a dependency case. The social
cost and personal risk of an erroneous decision in this area are too great to permit
the casual application of a preponderance standard. Unless this standard is
changed, society will ultimately suffer.
LINDA LEE REIMER STEVENSON
165. See supra note 39.
166. See supra note 37.
167. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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